Abstract. An (n, t, d, n−t)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme (with uniformity) for F k q over Fq is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme where the secret is selected from F k q and each of the n shares is an element of Fq. Moreover, there is t-privacy (in addition, any t shares are uniformly random in F t q ) and, if one considers the d-fold "component-wise" product of any d sharings, then the d-fold component-wise product of the d respective secrets is (n − t)-wise uniquely determined by it. Such schemes are a fundamental primitive in information-theoretically secure multi-party computation. Perhaps counter-intuitively, secure multi-party computation is a very powerful primitive for communication-efficient two-party cryptography, as shown recently in a series of surprising results from 2007 on. Moreover, the existence of asymptotically good arithmetic secret sharing schemes plays a crucial role in their communication-efficiency: for each d ≥ 2, if A(q) > 2d, where A(q) is Ihara's constant, then there exists an infinite family of such schemes over Fq such that n is unbounded, k = Ω(n) and t = Ω(n), as follows from a result at CRYPTO'06. Our main contribution is a novel paradigm for constructing asymptotically good arithmetic secret sharing schemes from towers of algebraic function fields. It is based on a new limit that, for a tower with a given Ihara limit and given positive integer , gives information on the cardinality of the -torsion sub-groups of the associated degree-zero divisor class groups and that we believe is of independent interest. As an application of the bounds we obtain, we relax the condition A(q) > 2d from the CRYPTO'06 result substantially in terms of our torsion-limit. As a consequence, this result now holds over nearly all finite fields Fq. For example, if d = 2, it is sufficient that q = 8, 9 or q ≥ 16.
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considers the d-fold "component-wise" product of any d sharings, then the dfold component-wise product of the d respective secrets is (n − t)-wise uniquely determined by it.
Such schemes, first based on Shamir's scheme and later abstracted and generalized, are fundamental to (information-theoretically) secure multi-party computation [2, 6, 15, 10] . Please refer to Section 5 for details about two main, wellknown applications. Note that both concern protocols for "secure multiplication" and that the properties of arithmetic secret sharing are used somewhat differently from what their definition perhaps seems to suggest on first encounter. Secure multiplication is a fundamental primitive in its own right, as secure multi-party computation is often based on combinations of secure addition and secure multiplication, the latter typically being demanding and involved while the former is typically much more straightforward. Arithmetic secret sharing allows efficient recovery of the secret in the presence of faulty shares, by a generalization of a result from [12] (see Section 5) and also gives rise to verifiable secret sharing [10] .
A series of surprising results, concerning zero-knowledge for circuit satisfiability ("MPC in the Head"), two-party secure computation, OT-combiners, correlation extractors, and OT from noisy channels [23, 24, 18, 22, 13, 21] , has caused nothing less than a paradigm shift that perhaps appears even as counterintuitive: secure multi-party computation is a very powerful abstract primitive for communication-efficient two-party cryptography. All these results use arithmetic secret sharing schemes, typically with d = 2 (see also [11] for an application with d > 2). Note that both [22, 21] are information-theoretic in nature, require the uniformity property, and also use the error correction procedure.
Also surprisingly, the existence of asymptotically good arithmetic secret sharing schemes plays a crucial role in the communication-efficiency of these recent, fundamental results on two-party cryptography: as follows from [7] , for each d ≥ 2, if A(q) > 2d (where A(q) is Ihara's constant from algebraic geometry, see Section 2) then there exists an infinite family of such schemes over F q such that n is unbounded, k = Ω(n) and t = Ω(n). Using these schemes (for d = 2), "constant-rate communication" has been achieved in those results, due to the removal of logarithmic terms caused by approaches using (appropriate modes of) Shamir's scheme [32] . Note that the original motivation of [7] was to give a communication-efficient asymptotic version of the "fundamental theorem of perfect information-theoretically secure multi-party computation" of [2, 6] , by combining the asymptotically good scheme from [7] with the results from [10] . In particular, the field F q of computation can be fixed, the number n of players is unbounded, and a malicious t-adversary is tolerated with t = Ω(n).
In [9] , an extension of [7] is given where F k q is replaced by F q k . It follows by the results of [4] that asymptotically good (n, t, d, n−t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes for F k q over F q exist over any finite field, with the caveat that the uniformity property does not hold after application of the dedicated descent technique to the result from [7] . Therefore, A(q) > 2d is the weakest known condition under which asymptotically good (n, t, d, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes with uniformity (for F whereas previously the best known lower bound was 0.42. As an application, the asymptotic version of the Fundamental Theorem in principle tolerates a stronger adversary (by a constant factor). Our results also have a bearing on the study of the asymptotic complexity of multiplication in finite extension fields of F q , but we do not elaborate on this here. This paper is organized as follows. Our main contributions are captured in Definition 2 (the torsion-limit), Theorem 1 (bounds for this limit), Theorem 6 (sufficient conditions for Riemann-Roch system solvability) and Main Theorems 1 and 2 (claimed arithmetic secret sharing schemes). After giving some preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce our torsion limit in Section 3 and show our bounds. In Section 4 we introduce Riemann-Roch systems of equations and show how these may be solved using the bounds from Section 3. In Section 5 we introduce an elementary framework in which our quantitative results can be conveniently stated and apply our bounds to obtain the claimed arithmetic secret sharing schemes. Efficiency issues are also discussed there.
Preliminaries
For a prime power q, let F q be a finite field of q elements. An algebraic function field over F q in one variable is a field extension F ⊃ F q such that F is a finite algebraic extension of F q (x) for some x ∈ F that is transcendental over F q . F/F q denotes a function field with full constant field F q ; g(F ) and N (F ) are the genus and the number of rational places of F respectively. P(F ) denotes the set of places of F , which is an infinite set, and P (k) (F ) is the (finite) subset consisting of the places of degree k of F . N i (F ) is the number of rational places of the constant field extension F q i F , i.e., N i (F ) = N (F q i F ) (note that N (F ) = N 1 (F )); Div(F ) is the divisor group of F and Div 0 (F ) its subset consisting of the divisors of degree 0; Prin(F ) is the principal divisor group of F ; Cl(F ) is the divisor class group Div(F )/Prin(F ) of F and Cl 0 (F ) = J F is the zero divisor class group Div 0 (F )/Prin(F ) of F , which is a finite group of cardinality h(F ) = |Cl 0 (F )| (the class number); A r (F ) is the set of effective divisors of degree r ≥ 0, which is a finite set, and A r (F ) denotes its cardinality; Cl 
The zeta function of F is defined by the following power series
All these facts about the L-polynomial can be found in [34] . Again, when F is clear from the context we write Z(T ) and L(T ) for its zeta function and L-polynomial, respectively. From the definition of zeta function, one obtains
where F ranges over all function fields of genus g over F q , and define A(q) := lim sup g→∞ N q (g)/g, Ihara's constant. Vlǎduţ and Drinfeld showed A(q) ≤ √ q−1. Ihara [20] showed that A(q) ≥ √ q−1 for any square power q. Hence, A(q) = √ q − 1 for all square powers. Zink [42] , and Bezerra et al. [3] (see also Bassa et al. [1] ) showed that A(q
Serre showed that there is a absolute constant c > 0 such that A(q) ≥ c · log(q) for all prime powers q. 
exists, one can define this limit to be the Ihara limit, denoted by A(F). It is clear that there exists a family E = {E/F q } of function fields such that g(E) → ∞ and the Ihara limit A(E) is equal to A(q).
Remark 1 In general, we can define the Ihara limit for any family
. However, for convenience of this paper, we define the Ihara limit only for those families {E/F q } whose limit lim g(E)→∞ N (E)/g(E) exists.
Torsion Point Limits
For the applications in this paper, we are interested in considering, in addition to the Ihara limit of a family of function fields, a limit for the number of torsion points of the zero divisor class groups of these function fields. Let F/F q be a function field. For a positive integer r > 1, we denote by
Definition 1 For each family F = {F/F q } of function fields with g(F ) → ∞, we define
We define an asymptotic notion involving both J r (F) and the Ihara limit A(F).
Definition 2 (The torsion-limit) For a prime power q, r ∈ Z >1 and a ∈ R, let F be the set of families {F} of function fields over F q such that genus in each family tends to ∞ and the Ihara limit A(F) ≥ a for every F ∈ F. Then the asymptotic quantity J r (q, a) is defined by J r (q, a) = lim inf F ∈F J r (F).
Thus, for a given family, the limit J r (F) measures the r-torsion against the genus. The corresponding constant J r (q, a) measures, for a given Ihara limit a and for given r, the "least possible r-torsion." Note that A(q), Ihara's constant, is the supremum of A(F) taken over all asymptotically good F over F q . Now we are ready to state the main results of this section.
Theorem 1 Let F q be a finite field and let r > 1 be a prime.
The first part of Theorem 1, as well as the second part when, additionally, r|q, is proved directly using a theorem of Weil [38, 27] on torsion in Abelian varieties. 5 The second part, in the case r q and r (q − 1), can be proved by using Weil pairing for abelian varieties and we will show it in Section 3.1 below. The most interesting is perhaps the bound in the third part, which is substantially smaller (we prove that bound in Section 3.2).
Theorem 2 Let F q be a finite field of characteristic p.
(ii) Write r as p m for some ≥ 0 and a positive integer m co-prime to p. If q is a square, then J r (q,
Proof. The result follows quite directly from the case of prime r considered in Theorem 1 together with some observations about group torsion. We prove this formally in Section 3.3 below.
Finally, we show existence of certain function field families that is essential for our applications in Section 5.
Theorem 3 For every q ≥ 8 except for q = 11 or 13, there exists a family F of function fields over F q such that the Ihara limit A(F) exists and it satisfies A(F) > 1 + J 2 (F).
Proof. We prove it in two steps. The first one is to prove that the result is true for all q ≥ 17 by using class field theory. The second step is to show that the result holds for q = 8, 9, 16 by looking at each individual q. For q ≥ 17, we prove the result only for odd q. For even q, we can similarly get it by considering the Artin-Schreier extensions. Choose 7 nonzero square elements t 1 , . . . , t 7 in F q (this is possible since (q − 1)/2 ≥ 7). For each i, consider the extension if m is co-prime to the characteristic p of K; and A[p] is isomorphic to (Z/pZ) a for some 0 ≤ a ≤ g, where g is the dimension of A. See also [30] . This implies upper bounds if K is not algebraically closed.
The three places, ∞ and those lying above x, are completely splitting in K 1 · · · K 7 /K. Since the 2-rank of the Galois group of K 1 · · · K 7 /K is 6 which is equal to 2 + 2 √ 3 + 1, K has an infinite (2, S)-Hilbert class field tower F, where S consists of the three places ∞ and those lying above x. This yields A(F) ≥ 3/(g(K) − 1) = 3/2 (see [31] or [29, Corollary 2.7.8]). Now we have A(F) ≥ 3/2 > 1 + 2/ log 2 (17) ≥ 1 + 2/ log 2 q ≥ 1 + J 2 (F). For q = 8, by the lower bound for cubics from Section 2 we know that there exists a family F over
For q = 9, by the result for squares from Section 2 we know that there exists a family F over
by the result for squares from Section 2 we know that there exists a family F over
Proof Theorem 1(ii)
For an abelian variety A defined over a field k and a positive integer m, the m-torsion point group, denoted by A[m], is defined to be the set of the points over the algebraic closurek annihilated by m. We know that A[m] is isomorphic to (Z/mZ) 2g if m is co-prime to the characteristic p of k; and A[p] is isomorphic to (Z/pZ) a for a non-negative integer a ≤ g, where g is the dimension of A (see [38, 27] ). We also denote by A(k) the set of k-rational points. Thus, the set of
If m is co-prime with the characteristic of k, then we can define the Weil pairing to be a map e m from A[m] ×Â[m] to G m , whereÂ denotes the dual abelian variety of A and G m Z/mZ is the group of m-th roots of unity ink. The Weil paring e m has some properties such as bilinear, non-degenerate, commuting with the Galois action of Gal(k/k) (see [26] ), etc. More precisely:
If there is a polarization λ from A toÂ, we get a pairing:
. From now on, we assume that A is a Jacobian over k. Then there is a principal polarization λ from A toÂ which is an isomorphism. In this case, we denote e t and w m (P, tQ) = w m (P, Q) t for any t ≥ 0 and P, Q ∈ A[m]. To derive an upper bound on the size of r-torsion points, we need the following result which can be derived easily by using linear algebra.
Lemma 1 For a prime r, consider an F r -vector space W of dimension n and a non-degenerate bilinear map e : W ×W −→ F r , i.e., e(x+z, y) = e(x, y)+e(z, y), e(x, y + z) = e(x, y) + e(x, z), and if e(x, u) = 0 for all x ∈ W , then u = 0. If V is an F r -subspace of W with e(x, y) = 0 for all x, y ∈ V , then dim Fr V ≤ n/2.
Applying Lemma 1 to the Weil paring w r , we obtain the following:
Proof. Let ζ be a rth primitive root of unity and consider the bilinear map (P, Q) → a ∈ Z/rZ, where a satisfies ζ a = w r (P, Q). Now apply Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 Let k = F q and assume that a prime r does not divide
Proof. If r is the characteristic of k, then it follows from the Weil bound. Now assume that r is not the characteristic of k. It is easy to verify that A(k) [r] is an F r -subspace of A[r]. For any σ in the Galois group Gal(k/k), one has w r (P, Q) = w r (P σ , Q σ ) = w r (P, Q) σ . This implies that w r (P, Q) is an element of k. However, the only r-th root of unity in k is 1. We get w r (P, Q) = 1 for all P, Q ∈ A(k) [r] . Our desired result follows from Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 1(iii)
Let F q be a finite field. Write p for its characteristic. For a function field F over [16] , recursively defined by
, where
n . The following facts can be found in [16] .
1. The tower F attains Drinfeld-Vlǎduţ bounds, i.e., its limit A(F) is given by
2. For any place P ∈ P(F (n−1) ) and any place Q ∈ P(F (n) ) such that Q|P we have d(Q|P ) = ( √ q + 2)(e(Q|P ) − 1), where d(Q|P ) and e(Q|P ) denote the different exponent and ramification index.
We will now show
In particular lim n→∞
Then Theorem 1(iii) is a direct corollary of the above theorem. Without loss of generality we can assume that the constant fields of the function fields are F q . We will use the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Deuring-Shafarevich (see e.g. [19] )) Let E/F be a Galois extension of function fields over F q . Suppose its Galois group is a p-group.
Proof of Theorem 4: Consider the extension F (n) /F (n−1) . As this is an ArtinSchreier extension, it is Galois and its Galois-group is a p-group. By RiemannHurwitz (see e.g. [34] and fact 2. above), and by Deuring-Shafarevich, respectively,
Combining these two equations we find
Using the fact that γ(F (0) ) = 0 and applying induction, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
We first show how to lift the previous results from
Lemma 2 Let k = F q and let r be a prime. If A is an Abelian variety over k
Proof. We prove it by induction. The case t = 1 is the given condition. Assume it holds for t−1.
The desired result follows.
Proposition 2 Let k = F q and assume that a prime r does not divide q − 1.
Proof. Part 1 is the direct result of Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. To prove Part 2, we factorize m into the product p p sp × s of prime powers, where
sp is a factor of q − 1 and s = m/d. By Part 1 and the follow-
Theorem 1(iii), Lemma 2, and Proposition 2 now imply Theorem 2.
Riemann Roch systems of equations
Let F/F q be an algebraic function field.
The Riemann-Roch system of equations in the indeterminate X is the system
determined by these data. A solution is some [G] ∈ Cl(F ) which satisfies all equations when substituted for X.
It is often more convenient to define systems over Div(F ) rather than Cl(F ). The idea of using Riemann-Roch systems of equations was already present in some papers, e.g. [36] , [39] , [40] .
Proof. Let S be the set {1 ≤ i ≤ L : r i ≥ 0}. For each i ∈ S, we argue as follows. Define the maps
Remark 2 ("Solving by taking any divisor X of large enough degree") (i) If r i < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , L, then the inequality in Theorem 6 is automatically satisfied and hence the Riemann-Roch system always has a solution. (ii) For instance, in [7] , it was simply assumed that r i < 0 to obtain (n, t, d, n−t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes. But this does not always give the best results. In particular, in Section 5, we will show how we can employ Theorem 6 to get improvements, especially for small finite fields.
Application to arithmetic secret sharing
We first recall the results of [7] , cast in a novel, technical framework. 7 This will make it possible to state our main quantitative results on arithmetic secret sharing in transparent language, which also facilitates easy comparison with earlier work. Let k, n be integers with k, n ≥ 1. Consider the F q -vector space F k q × F n q , where F q is an arbitrary finite field. by the projection (s 1 , . . . , s k , c 1 , . . . , c n ) → (s 1 , . . . , s k ). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the F q -vector space morphism π i :
is defined by the projection (s 1 , . . . , s k , c 1 
by v A . We write I * = {1, . . . , n}. It is also sometimes convenient to refer to v 0 as the secret-component of v and to v I * as its sharescomponent.
is the secret and c I * ∈ F n q the shares.
The first condition means that, in C, the secret can take any value in F k q . More precisely, for a uniformly random vector c ∈ C, the secret c 0 is uniformly random in F k q . This follows from the fact that the projection (π 0 ) |C is regular (since it is a surjective F q -vector space morphism). The second condition means that the shares uniquely determine the secret. Indeed, the shares do not always determine the secret uniquely if and only if there are c, c ∈ C such that their shares coincide but not their secrets. Therefore, by linearity, the shares determine the secret uniquely if and only if the shares being zero implies the secret being zero. Moreover this condition implies that k ≤ n. Note that an n-code with the stronger condition (Ker π I * ) ∩ C = (Ker π 0 ) ∩ C is a k-dimensional error correcting code of length n.
Definition 6 (r-reconstructing)
In other words, r-reconstructing means that any r shares uniquely determine the secret. Note that r ≤ n by definition of an n-code.
is surjective for each A ⊂ I * with |A| = t. If, additionally, π A (C) = F t q , we say C is t-uniform.
If t > 0, then t-disconnectedness means the following. Let A ⊂ I
* with |A| = t. Then, for uniformly randomly c ∈ C, the secret c 0 is independently distributed from the t shares c A . Indeed, for the same reason that the secret c 0 is uniformly random in F k q , it holds that (c 0 , c A ) is uniformly random in F k q ×π A (C). Since the uniform distribution on the Cartesian-product of two finite sets corresponds to the uniform distribution on one set, and independently, the uniform distribution on the other, the claim follows. Uniformity means that, in addition, c A is uniformly random in F t q .
Definition 8 (Generator of an n-Code) A generator (k 0 , σ) of an n-code C consists of a positive integer k 0 and a surjective F q -vector space morphism σ :
In particular, a generator selects an element of C with a prescribed secret. We can always assume k 0 ≤ n. Note that a generator can be represented by a matrix defined by the columns (or rows, depending on one's view) σ(e 1 , 0), . . . , σ(e k , 0), σ(0, e 1 ), . . . , σ(0, e k0 ), where the e i 's are the standard unit-vectors in F k q , and the e j 's are the standard unit-vectors in F k0 q . Given such a matrix-representation, selecting a uniformly random c ∈ C such that its secret equals some prescribed value, can be done efficiently. By elementary linear algebra, this also holds for r-reconstruction of a secret. Similarly, a generator can be computed efficiently from a basis of C. Remark 4 Let C be an n-code for F k q and let (k 0 , σ) be a generator. For an integer d ≥ 2, suppose C * d is an n-code. If d = 2, then it is easy to see that C is generated by the vectors x * y ∈ F k q × F n q , where x, y range over all pairs of vectors selected from σ(e 1 , 0), . . . , σ(e k , 0), σ(0, e 1 ), . . . , σ(0, e k0 ). Since, for i = 1, . . . , k, the vector σ(e i , 0) * σ(e i , 0) has the i-th unit vector as its secretcomponent, a generator for C can be efficiently constructed from (k 0 , σ). This generalizes to d > 2 in a straightforward way.
Definition 9 (Powers of an
Definition 10 (Arithmetic secret sharing scheme) An (n, t, d, r)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme for
, and C * d is r-reconstructing. C has uniformity if, in addition, it is t-uniform.
For example, the case k = 1, d = 2, n = 3t + 1, r = n − t, q > n obtained from Shamir's secret sharing scheme (taking into account that degrees sum up when taking products of polynomials) corresponds to the secret sharing scheme used in [2, 6] . The properties are easily proved using Lagrange's Interpolation Theorem. The generalization to k > 1 of this Shamir-based approach is due to [15] . The abstract notion is due to [10] , where also constructions for d = 2 were given based on general linear secret sharing. See also [7] [8] [9] . On the other hand the following limitations are easy to establish.
Proposition 3 Let C be an (n, t, d, r)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme for F k q over F q . As a linear secret sharing scheme for F k q over F q , C has t-privacy and
Stronger bounds are also known [5] . We note that arithmetic secret sharing schemes enjoy efficient recovery of the secret in the presence of faulty shares. The theorem below is a generalization of a result from [12] .
Theorem 7 Let i, j be integers with 1 ≤ i < j. Suppose C and C * j are n-codes for F k q . If the n-code C * i is t-disconnected and if C * j has (n − t)-reconstruction, then, given a generator for C, there is an efficient algorithm for the n-code C * (j−i) that, on inputã := c I * + e ∈ F n q (faulty shares) with c ∈ C * (j−i) and e ∈ F n q of Hamming-weight at most t, outputs c 0 ∈ F k q (correct secret).
Proof. Note that if C and C * j are an n-codes, then so is C * j for any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ j. Let c ∈ C * (j−i) . Let (0, e) ∈ F k q ×F n q such that e has Hamming-weight at most t. Definec = c + (0, e) and letã =c I * = c I * + e. Write u = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ F k q . Consider the system of equations {ã * x I * = y I * , x 0 = u, x ∈ C * i , y ∈ C * j }, in the unknowns x, y. Note that this is in fact a linear system of equations (taking into account that, of course, membership of a subspace can be captured by a linear system of equations). We prove now that, first, this system has some solution (x, y), and that, second, any solution (x, y) satisfies c 0 = y 0 . Efficiency then follows by linear algebra, in combination with the fact that a generator for C is given and that generators for the higher powers can be constructed efficiently from it. First, define A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} as the set of all i with e i = 0. Since C * i is t−disconnected, there is z ∈ C * i such that z 0 = u and z A = 0. Then x := z, y := c * z is a solution. Second, let (x, y) be any solution. Then, for at least n − |A| ≥ n − t indices within I * it holds that the vectors c * x ∈ C * j and y ∈ C * j coincide. Since C * j has (n − t)-reconstruction and since x 0 = u, the claim follows.
We briefly sketch two well-known applications. First, consider an (n, t, 2, n)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme C for F k q over F q . Such a scheme can be used to reduce n-party secure multiplication to secure addition in the case of a honestbut-curious adversary, at the cost of one round of interaction. From the definition, it follows there is an F q -vector space morphism ψ :
for all c, c ∈ C, ψ (c 1 c 1 , . . . , c n c n ) = c 0 * c 0 . The reduction works as follows.
8 Let c I * , c I * ∈ F n q be secret-sharings, with respective secrets c 0 , c 0 ∈ F k q (c, c ∈ C). Using a generator for C, player P i secret-shares (λ i1 c i c i , . . . , λ ik c i c i ) ∈ F k q , where the coefficient vector is the "i-th row of the matrix representing ψ in the standard basis" (i = 1, . . . , n) . Next, player P j sums the n received shares (j = 1, . . . , n) . This gives a secret-sharing of c 0 * c 0 according to C (see e.g. [9] ). This generalizes Shamir-based solutions from [2, 6, 15 ] (see also [10] ).
Second, consider an (n, t, 2, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme C for F k q over F q . Such a scheme can be used for "zero-knowledge verification of secret multiplications." In a nutshell, the main idea is as follows. Suppose a prover puts forward commitments to secrets x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ∈ F k q , and claims that x 0 * y 0 = z 0 . To prove his claim, he gives ("coordinate-wise") commitments to random x, y ∈ C where the respective secrets are the x 0 , y 0 from the input, and a ("coordinatewise") commitment to a random z ∈ C * 2 where the secret is the z 0 ∈ F k q from the input. If the commitment scheme is F q -linear, then it is easy to enforce that indeed x, y ∈ C and z ∈ C * 2 , and that the respective secrets are indeed the ones from the input. Now, if z = x * y (as an honest prover would choose), then indeed x 0 * y 0 = z 0 . In this case, inspection of any t "share-triples" (x i , y i , z i ) gives no information on the "secret-triple" (x 0 , y 0 , x 0 y 0 ). Yet, z i = x i y i for each of those t share-triples. On the other hand, suppose z 0 = x 0 * y 0 . Then there are at most n − t − 1 share-triples (x i , y i , z i ) such that z i = x i y i , and hence there are at least t + 1 share-triples for which an inconsistency could show up. These facts together give a handle to checking that z 0 = x 0 y 0 in several different application scenarios, most notably perfect information-theoretically secure general multi-party computation, in the case of a malicious adversary. See [11] for an application with d > 2. The procedure above is essentially from [10] (which was inspired by ideas from [2, 6] ).
We are now ready to state the asymptotical results from [7] in full generality.
9
Let F/F q be an algebraic function field (in one variable, with F q as field of constants). Let g denote the genus of F . Let k, t, n ∈ Z with n > 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
, n − t)-arithmetic sharing scheme for F k q over F q with uniformity. Theorem 9 (from [7] ). Fix d ≥ 2 and a finite field F q . Suppose A(q) > 2d, where A(q) is Ihara's constant. Then there is an infinite family of (n, t, d, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes for F k q over F q with uniformity such that n is unbounded, k = Ω(n) and t = Ω(n). Moreover, for every scheme C in the family, a generator for C is poly(n)-time computable and C * i has poly(n)-time reconstruction of a secret in the presence of t faulty shares (i = 1, . . . , d − 1).
Since A(q) = √ q − 1 if q is a square, it holds that A(q) > 2d if q is a square with q > (2d + 1) 2 . Also, by Serre's Theorem, A(q) > c log q for some absolute constant c > 0. Therefore, A(q) > 2d if q is (very) large. 10 The asymptotical result from [7] plays an important communication-saving role in two-party cryptography, see [23, 24, 18, 22, 13, 21] . Often, the point is that terms in the communication analysis which would otherwise be logarithmic can be made constant using the [7] results. Note that [22, 21] also use the efficient error correction. We will now apply our results on the torsion-limit in combination with appropriate Riemann-Roch systems in order to relax the condition A(q) > 2d considerably. As a result, we attain the result of [7] but this time over nearly all finite fields.
is an (n, t, d, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme for F k q over F q (with uniformity).
Proof. First note that if the system is solvable, then the Weak Approximation Theorem guarantees that we can take a solution G ∈ Div(F ) such that supp G ∩ supp D = ∅. We claim that the condition that (K − G + P A + Q) = 0 for A ⊂ I * with |A| = t implies t-disconnection and uniformity on the code.
where the second equality follows by application of the Riemann-Roch theorem to G and to G − Q − P A . Hence, (K − G) ≤ (K − G + Q + P A ) = 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that Q, P A ≥ 0 and where the equality holds by assumption. Therefore, (K − G) = 0 and dim(Im φ) = deg(Q + P A ) = k + t. We conclude that φ is surjective and this proves the claim. Finally we prove (n − t)-
, it is sufficient to prove that, for all f ∈ L(dG), the following holds: if the condition f (P i ) = 0 holds for all i ∈ B, then f (Q j ) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since P B = D − Q − P A for some A ⊂ I * with |A| = t, it holds that L(dG − P B ) = L(dG − D + P A + Q), which by assumption has dimension 0. Hence, f ∈ L(dG − P B ) = {0}, and f = 0.
And now as a corollary of Theorems 6 and 10 we get the following: . r 1 := 2g − s + t + k − 2 and r 2 := ds − n + t, then there exists an (n, t, d, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing scheme for F k q over F q with uniformity.
Main Theorem 1 Let F q be a finite field and d ∈ Z ≥2 . If there exists 0 < A ≤ A(q) such that A > 1 + J d (q, A), then there is an infinite family of (n, t, d, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes for F k q over F q with t-uniformity where n is unbounded, k = Ω(n) and t = Ω(n).
This will follow from the more precise statement in Theorem 11 below. Combining Main Theorem 1 with Theorem 3 we obtain, in the special case d = 2:
Main Theorem 2 For q = 8, 9 and for all prime powers q ≥ 16 there is an infinite family of (n, t, 2, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes for F k q over F q with t-uniformity where n is unbounded, k = Ω(n) and t = Ω(n).
As to efficiency, when given a divisor that is a solution to these RiemannRoch systems, it is efficient to compute a generator for the scheme C defined by this divisor. However, solving Riemann-Roch systems efficiently in full generality is subject of further research. In particular, for our strongest results to follow it is not known at present how to efficiently compute a generator. But of course, there exists a poly(n)-size description of generators, so overall, there is efficiency as before, but now in the weaker model where such description is given as advice.
More precisely, we have the following result (for d > 2 there is a similar analysis).
Theorem 11 Let F q be a finite field. Suppose κ ∈ [0, 
Then there is an infinite family of (n, t, 2, n−t)-arithmetic secret sharing schemes for F k q over F q with uniformity where n is unbounded, k = κn +1 and t = τ n .
The proof of this fact relies on showing that the conditions in Corollary 2 are satisfied asymptotically for a family of function field with Ihara's limit A, if the requirements of Theorem 11 are met. It is easy to show why Theorem 11 implies Main Theorem 2: if 0 < A ≤ A(q) is such that A > 1 + J 2 (q, A) we can always select κ ∈ (0, 1 3 ) and τ ∈ (0, 1] satisfying the conditions in Theorem 11. Note that in order to obtain the result in Main Theorem 2 we require κ > 0.
We prove Theorem 11 formally below, but give here an an indication of how one would bound asymptotically each parameter in the inequality of Corollary 2. Of course |J F [2] | is dealt with asymptotically with the torsion limit J 2 (q, A) which we have introduced in this paper. Stirling's Formula gives an asymptotical bound for the binomial coefficients n t when t is some fixed fraction of n. Finally the quotients A r /h can be bounded by means of algebraic geometric techniques which have been used before in the code theoretic literature, for instance [25] , [28] , [39] , [40] . We state now an upper bound of this type.
Proposition 4 Let F/F q be a function field with g ≥ 1. Then, for any r ∈ Z with 0 ≤ r ≤ g − 1, A r /h ≤ g q g−r−1 (
(see Lemma 5.1.4 and Corollary 5.1.11 in [34] ). This has been exploited in Lemma 3 (ii) from [28] , to show that
where L(T ) is the L-polynomial associated to the zeta function of F . The claim from Proposition 4 can be derived from a relation that is obtained by taking the limit as T tends to 1/q on both sides of the equation above, where l'Hôpital's Rule is applied on the right hand side, then finding an expression for L (1/q) (using the Functional Equation for L-polynomials and the fact that L(1) = h) and substituting that back in. This is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.5 (in the case s = 0) in [40] .
Proof of Theorem 11. Fix any A, κ, τ satisfying the conditions of the statement. Let F = {F m } m>0 be an infinite family of algebraic function fields over F q with g( − 3 one can see that this expression is at most log q 2 − κ 3(1+κ) Ag m and this is clearly smaller than 0 for large enough m. Therefore, we can apply Corollary 2 to F m , for each m > M 0 (for some constant M 0 ), and we have an (n m , t m ,2 ,n m − t m )-arithmetic secret sharing scheme for F km q over F q with uniformity, with k m = κn m + 1 and t m = τ n m . Since N (F m ) tends to ∞ as m tends to ∞ (because A(F) ≥ A > 0) then the set M = {n m } m≥M0 is infinite. This concludes the proof.
Finally, using our paradigm we also improve the explicit lower bounds for the parameter τ (q) from [7] and [4] for all q with q ≤ 81 and q square, as well as for all q with q ≤ 9. Recall τ (q) is defined as the maximum value of 3t/(n − 1) which can be obtained asymptotically (when n tends to infinity) when t, n are subject to the condition that an (n, t, 2, n − t)-arithmetic secret sharing for F q over F q exists (no uniformity required here). The new bounds are shown in the upper row of Table 1 . All the new bounds marked with a star (*) are obtained by applying Theorem 11 in the case κ = 0 and using the upper bounds given in Theorem 1 for the torsion limits. To obtain the rest of the new upper bounds, for each q, we apply the field descent technique in [4] to F q 2 (in the special case of F 9 , even though Theorem 11 can be applied directly, as remarked in Main Theorem 2, it is better to apply Theorem 11 to F 81 and then use the descent technique). These are compared with the previous bounds: the ones obtained in [7] (marked also with the symbol (*)), and the rest, which were obtained in [4] by means of the aforementioned field descent technique. 
